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The Effects of Conformity on False Recognition in the Deese-Roediger-
McDermott paradigm 
　　This study examined whether a confederate’s response can affect false 
recognition in the Deese-Roediger-McDermott（DRM）paradigm. After the 
participants studied a long list of 75 word（five 15-word DRM sublists）, they 
received three successive five-word recognition tests（old/new）; each test 
comprised all（critical）non-presented words. The participants were tested 
individually during the initial and final recognition tests, whereas a 
confederate was present during the second test. In the latter test, half of the 
participants always made a judgment aloud after the confederate’s response
（all “old” or all “new”）. The remaining participants always made the first 
response aloud with the confederate responding second. The results showed 
that conformity affects recognition memory: the confederate’s correct 
responses（all “new”）decreased the participant’s false recognition of words 
regardless of the order of response（i.e., participant first or second）. These 
results are discussed within the context of the source monitoring framework.
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　　Over the past decade, false memories have been the object of numerous 
studies. One popular paradigm for false memory research was developed by 
Roediger and McDermott（1995）, based on earlier research by Deese（1959）, 
and now known as the Deese-Roediger-McDermott（DRM）paradigm. In the 
DRM paradigm, participants learn lists of words that are all semantically 
associated with the same critical non-presented word. Each list is composed 
words related to one critical non-presented word. For example, a list for the 
critical non-presented word ‘sleep’ is: bed, rest, awake, tired, dream, wake, 
night, blanket, doze, slumber, snore, pillow, peace, yawn, and drowsy. 
Experiments using this paradigm have revealed remarkable levels of false 
recognition of critical non-presented words, and numerous studies have 
focused on the boundary conditions that affect these false memories（for 
reviews, see Gallo, 2006; Roediger, Balota, & Watson, 2001; Roediger, 
McDermott, & Goff, 1997; Roediger, McDermott, & Robinson, 1998）.
　　The study described here was motivated by one simple question: Does 
social influence, such as social conformity, affect false recognition in the DRM 
paradigm? Several researchers have investigated social conformity effects 
using recognition paradigm（Itsukushima, Hanyu, Okabe, Naka, Itoh, & 
Hara, 2006; Meade & Roediger, 2002; Schneider & Watkins, 1996; Wright, 
Mathews, & Skagerberg, 2005; Wright, Self, & Justice, 2000）. In one of the 
first studies to address this question, Schneider and Watkins（1996, 
Experiment 2）demonstrated conformity involving a single confederate in a 
standard recognition test. After the participant studied a long list of words, 
he or she, along with a confederate, received an oral recognition test. For each 
test word, the participant and the confederate took turns in responding aloud. 
Sometimes the confederate responded first; other times the participant 
responded first. The initial response of the confederate increased both hit and 
false alarm rates of the participant’s second response. In sum, this study 
provides strong evidence that recognition judgment can be affected by a 
confederate’s response.
　　However, some researchers（Reysen, 2005; Roediger, Meade, & Bergman, 
2001）have pointed out that Schneider and Watkins’s（1996）results could be 




conform to a confederate’s responses in a group or public setting, but do not 
accept them privately. To determine whether a confederate’s responses 
actually influence the participant’s memory, we must assess the participant’s 
performance on the individual recognition test. In the present study, 
therefore, the participants received three successive recognition tests, all of 
which comprised critical non-presented words. The initial and final 
recognitions were individual（private）, whereas the second test occurred with 
a confederate present（public）. The critical dependent measure was the 
participant’s measure on the final individual recognition test.
　　In fact, Reysen（2005）demonstrated private conformity effects on 
recognition memory using individual tests with a virtual confederate. 
Therefore, we might expect that participants’ final recognition performance 
would be influenced by responses generated by a confederate. Accordingly, the 
presented study manipulated confederate’s word response order vis a vis the 
participant’s response（i.e., first or second）and response type（i.e., all “old” 
or all “new”）as between-participants variables. We should expect to see more 
conformity when a participant’s responses follows a confederate’s responses 
than when the confederate follows the participant. Based on the persistence of 
false recognition in DRM paradigm（McDermott, 1996）, we predict that the 
confederate’s response of all “old” would produce more false recognitions than 
the all “new” response.
Method
Participants.
　　The participants were 96 female undergraduate students aged 18 to 28
（M＝19.7, SD＝1.4）. They were randomly assigned to each of four 
experimental conditions. Eight additional participants were excluded when 
they expressed suspicion about the confederate.
Design.
　　A 2（confederate’s response order: first or second）X 2（confederate’s 
response type: all old or all new）X 3（test type: first, second, or third 
recognition）mixed factorial design was used, with confederate’s response 
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order and type manipulated between participants and test type manipulated 
within participants.
Procedure.
　　One real true participant and 1 female confederate participated together. 
Both members of this pair were told to remember words, which would be 
presented by an audio tape player, in the study list in preparation for a 
subsequent recall memory test.
　　Presentation. List words were presented at the rate of one word per 
second. First, a recorded male voice read each of five study lists, speaking at 
the rate of one word per second. The lists were composed of 15 Japanese 
words each, and were the devil, stairs, listen, electric wave, and peace lists 
from Miyaji and Yama（2002）. All of the words from each list were followed 
immediately by all of the items from the next list, until all five lists were 
presented. The order of the five lists was consistent.
　　Filler task. Immediately after the lists were presented, both people took 
part in a 5 min filler task consisting of addition problems on a sheet of paper. 
They were instructed to complete as many problems as possible.
　　Initial individual recognition test. After the filler task, participants took 
a 5-word recognition test consisting only of critical non-presented words. 
Both the participant and the confederate received a response sheet. On each of 
five test trials, the experimenter visually presented a test word. Each test trial 
asked for two types of written responses. The first response was a “yes” or 
“no” corresponding to whether or not the participant thought the test word 
had been in the study list. The second response was a confidence rating 
ranging from one（“practically certain”）to five（“practically guessing”）.
　　Group recognition test. After a 5 min filler task that was identical to the 
previous filler task, there was a surprise group recognition test, identical to 
the individual recognition test except that a each participant was tested in the 
presence of a confederate. On each of five trials, the confederate gave the same 
response（“old” or “new”）. Half of the participants always made a judgment 
aloud after the confederate’s response（all “old” or all “new”）. The remaining 
participants always made the first response aloud, which was followed by the 




　　Final individual recognition test. After the group recognition test, 
everyone took part in another a filler task that was identical to the previous 
filler task（5 min）. Finally, they took a second individual recognition test, 




　　Table 1 shows the mean proportions of false alarms for each confederate’s 
response order and type on the initial individual recognition test. In the initial 
test, 79% and 87% of the critical non-presented words were falsely recognised, 
a rate similar to that observed by Roediger and McDermott（1995）.
　　The difference between initial individual test and group test─a measure 
of public conformity─showed that participants paired with a confederate 
responding all “new“ conformed more than those paired with a confederate 
responding all “old.” This pattern was true regardless of the order of 
responding. More importantly, performance on the final individual test─a 
measure of private conformity─showed that conforming on the group test 
affected a subsequent individual recognition performance. Again, this pattern 
was true, regardless of the order of responding.
　　More specifically, a 2（confederate’s response order: first or second）X 2
（confederate’s response type: all old or all new）X 3（test type: first, second, 
or third recognition）mixed analysis of variance（ANOVA）was performed 
on the false alarm scores. All analyses were considered as significant at the 
p＝.05 level or better unless otherwise noted. The result revealed that there 
was a significant main effect of test, F（2, 184）＝6.40, MSE＝.01, partial eta 
squared＝.070. More interestingly, there was a significant interaction between 
test and confederate’s response type, F（2, 184）＝12.42, MSE＝.01, partial eta 
squared＝.135. No other effects approached significance.
　　Neither the main effect of confederate’s response order nor interactions of 
response order with other variables were significant. Therefore, results were 
collapsed across the confederate’s response order. A 2（confederate’s response 
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type: all old or all new）X 3（test type: first, second, or third recognition）
mixed ANOVA revealed significant main effects of both confederate’s 
response type and of test with F（1, 92）＝2.77, MSE＝.13, partial eta 
squared＝.029 and F（2, 184）＝6.49, MSE＝.01, partial eta squared＝.065, 
respectively. We also found a significant interaction between confederate’s 
response type and test, F（2, 184）＝12.59, MSE＝.01, partial eta squared＝.118. 
A Tukey’s honestly significant difference test revealed that participants in the 
all “new” condition（falsely）recognized more critical words in initial 
recognition（M＝.83）than in group recognition（M＝.74）or in final 
recognition（M＝.74）. By contrast, participants in the all “old” conditions 
tended to recognize a similar proportion of critical words regardless of 
whether in initial recognition（M＝.83）, in group recognition（M＝.83）or in 
final recognition（M＝.85）.
　　In short, participants’ initial performance working with a confederate 
altered their subsequent false recognition. However, such pattern was 
observed for a confederate’s correct（i.e., all “new“）responses, not for a 
confederate’s incorrect（i.e., all “old”）responses.
Table 1　 Mean proportions of false alarms as a function of confederate’s 
response order and types on the three recognition tests.
Initial individual test Group test Final individual test
Confederate’s first
 All “old”  .82  .82 .85
（.19） （.26） （.24）
 All “new” .87 .78 .76
（.14） （.20） （.24）
Confederate’s second
 All “old” .84 .85 .86
（.18） （.19） （.19）
 All “new” .79 .71 .72
（.23） （.24） （.26）
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
Confidence ratings.




order and type on initial individual recognition test. As the table show, levels 
of confidence ratings were extremely high, ranging from a low of 4.03 to a 
high of 4.44. A similar 2（confederate’s response order: first or second）X 2
（confederate’s response type: all old or all new）X 3（test type: first, second, 
or third recognition）mixed ANOVA was performed on the confidence 
ratings. There were no main effects of confederate’s response order, F（1, 
92）＝0.21, MSE＝1.12, partial eta squared＝.002, confederate’s response type, F
（1, 92）＝2.32, MSE＝1.12, partial eta squared＝.025, or test type, F（2,184）＝
1.84, MSE＝.20, partial eta squared＝.020. In addition, none of the interactions 
of these variables were significant. However, given the very high level of 
confidence ratings, this null result should be treated with caution, as a 
genuine effect may have been masked by a ceiling effect. As such, I do not 
consider it further.
Table 2　 Mean confidence ratings as a function of confederate’s response 
order and types on the three recognition tests.
Initial individual test Group test Final individual test
Confederate’s first
 All “old” 4.23 4.42 4.44
（.44） （.44） （.44）
 All “new” 4.32 4.30 4.22
（.49） （.40） （.52）
Confederate’s second
 All “old” 4.33 4.20 4.37
（.46） （.62） （.58）
 All “new” 4.14 4.03 4.03
（.56） （.48） （.55）
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
Discussion
　　This study shows a private conformity effect on false recognition in the 
DRM paradigm: a confederate’s all “new” responses decreased false recognition 
not only in the group setting but also in a subsequent（private）recognition 
The Effects of Conformity on False Recognition in the Deese-Roediger-McDermott paradigm
─ 11 ─ 142
tests. This pattern was true regardless of whether participants responded 
first or second. By contrast, there was no private conformity effect with 
respect to confederate’s all “old” response. However, given the very high level 
of false alarms, this result should be treated with caution, as a genuine effect 
on bias may have been masked by a ceiling effect. In sum, the present finding 
is consistent with previous research, in which the private conformity effects 
on recognition memory have been demonstrated（Meade & Roediger, 2002; 
Raysen, 2005; Roediger et al., 2001）.
　　Why did confederate response order have no effect on public conformity 
in the group recognition test? According to the distinction between normative 
and informative influence（Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; see also Walther, Bless, 
Strack, Rackstraw, Wagner, & Werth, 2002）, normative influence is not 
contingent on uncertainty, whereas the amount of informational influence 
increases as confidence（i.e., certainty）decreases. In the DRM paradigm, 
participants often report similar phenomenological experiences for both list 
items and the critical non-presented items（Roediger & McDermott, 1995）. In 
other words, participants’ certainty of occurrence for non-presented items 
seems to be very high. Because participants tended to have high certainty, 
they may reflect normative influence, which determined group recognition 
performance in the public situation. In the present research, however, 
normative influence seems to be not so strong because a confederate was 
almost same-aged female. Therefore, confederate response order would have 
no effect on conformity in the group recognition test.
　　Why should social pressure in a group recognition test carry over to a 
final individual recognition test? One possible explanation may involve forced 
confabulation. The forced confabulation effect refers to the phenomenon that 
pressuring participants to provide made-up accounts of events creates false 
memory for them（Ackil & Zaragoza, 1998; Zaragoza, Payment, Ackil, 
Drivdahl, & Beck, 2001）. For example, Ackil and Zaragoza（1998）forced 
participants to answer questions about events that never happened in the 
video. One week later, these participants demonstrated false memories for the 
details they had fabricated earlier. One largely accepted interpretation─that 




confusing the source of the information that they actually experienced with 
the source of information they made up（Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 
1993; Mitchell & Johnson, 2000, 2009）. In the present research, because social 
pressure forced participants to conform to a confederate’s response in the 
group recognition test, it is likely that participants could invent responses. In 
other words, it is possible that similar source misattribution errors occur in 
the present case as found in situations requiring forced confabulation and 
memory conformity. Although this explanation is highly speculative, it 
suggests an interesting direction for future research.
　　In conclusion, the present experiment demonstrated a private conformity 
effect on false recognition in the DRM paradigm. Perhaps, the best 
explanation is that conformity effect on false recognition results from forced 
confabulation, which pressuring participants to provide made-up accounts of 
events creates false memory for them.
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